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huffer between soldiers and overzealous law enforcement agents. Implicit in her third alternative argument is the assumption 
that commanders will base their"investigatory detention" authorizations on "reasonable suspicion/' · 
I )'he Co!-lrt of ~ili!ary Appeals has yet to -clearly define. the Dun~ way rule in a military context. Both articles present potential 
approaches to .thls difficult issue. ·· · . 
. . . : ' . 
Investigative Detentions for Purposes of Fingerprhiting 
· Lieutenant Colonel David A. Schlueter (USAR) • 
Criminal Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School 
i- Introducti~n . 
Following a series of barracks larcenies, Naval Investiga~ 
tive Service (NIS) investigators received permission from a 
Marine battalion commander to fingerprint approximately 
100 servicemembers who had been present in the_ unit at the 
'time ()f the offenses. ·Among those ordered to report to the 
NIS office for fingerprinting was the accUsed, who was later 
linked to ·the crime through his fingerprints. Before the· ac-
cused· reported to -the NIS office there was no probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that he was in any 
·way involved -in the crimes. Were the fingerprints 
admissible? 
The court in United States v. Faga, 1 held that they were. 
Relying on. dicta in several Supreme Court decisions and 
the authority of a commander to act as a judicial ,officer, the 
court· held that the ·presence of the commander negated the 
requir~ment for probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 
This case points' out the difficult questions that faee investi~ 
gators,~ lawyers, and judges, when the issue is raised as to 
what procedures are required in investigative detentions for 
the purpose of obtaining fingerprints. 
Unfortunately, aside from Supreme COurt dicta and sev-
eral state court decisions, there is little guidance in the area. 
It is not yet clear whether the guidance that does exist is 
· even constitutional. This article addresses some of the ma-
jor issues that surround investigative detentions and offers 
some suggested approaches to the problem. 
DlUUiway, Davis, and Dicta 
In the typical investigative detention scenario, an individ-
ua~ is taken to the police station by law enforcement officers . 
for the purpose of interrogation, fingerprinting, production 
of other boQy e~idence, or participation in an eyewitness 
identification.'The common element'in all of.these activities 
is the fact. that these . sort of appearances ra~se fourth 
amendment seizure issues. Absent an individual's voluntary 
appearance at the police station, the government must nor-
mally demonstrate that. the police had .probable cause to 
take the suspect to their offices. For example, in Dunaway v. 
New York. 2 the Supreme Court held that removing a sus~ 
pect to the police station for purposes of custodial 
interrogation constitutes a seizure of the person that must 
be supported by probable cause. Although .the military 
courts have recognized the applicability of Du(Jaway to_ mil-
itary interrogations, they have not always been consistent in 
application of the rule. 3 
There seems to be a perceptible trend toward permitting 
investigative detentions for some purpose even when no 
probable cause is present. The trend js · fueled in large part 
by dicta in Davis v. Mississippi 4 and Hayes v. Florida. 5 In 
Davis, the defendant was one of 24 black youths brought to 
a police station for fingerprinting in connection with a rape 
case. The Supreme Court held that . the fingerprints so ob-
tained were the r~ult of an illegal detention. Whether these 
intrusions are labelled as arrests or investigative detentions, 
said the Court, the fourth amendment "was meant to pre~ 
vent wholesale intrusions upon personal security of our 
citizenry. . . . "., ln dicta; ·however, the Court indicated 
that because of the unique nature of fingerprinting, it was 
arguable that detentions for such purposes might comply 
with the fourth amendment even though there was no prob~ 
able cause in the traditional sense. 7 The Court noted that 
"fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable .and effective 
"'TTle author is an Associate Dean and Professor of Law at St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas. This article was adapted from remarks presented by 
the author at the 13th Annual Homer Ferg11son Conference 
I·. - .. . . ·. . . - -
. 24JvU. 86S (N.M.C.M.R. 1987). 
2442U.S. 200 (1979). · , , . 
l See United States v. Schneider, 14 M.J. 189 (C. M.A. 1982) (Dunaway is applicable to the military although the court recognized "obvious differences" 
between military and civilian practices; servicemember may legitimately be required to present infonnation without probable cause in a variety of places. 
Court lists factors to be considered in an ad hoc approach); United States _v. Scott, 22 M.J. 297 (C.M.A. 1986). Cf. United States v. Thomas, 21 M.J .. 928 
(A.C.M.R. 1986) (Dunaway not applicable where servicemember merely reports, even if involuntanly, to a location speCified by a superior's order. The test is 
whether by means of force or. show of authority, the person is subjected to significantly greater restraif11 upon their freedom of movement than other ser· 
vicemembers);United States v._ Price, l~ M.J, 628 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982) (Dunaway not applicable where aecused was one of 10 individuals ordered to report 
to NJS office). · · · · · 
4 394 u.s.c. 721 (1969), ,-
5470 u.s: 811 (1985), 
6 394 U.S. at 72f>.:-27. 
7 Id. at 727. 
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crime~solving tool than eyewitness identifications or co~'res­
sions and is not subjectto such abuses as the improperJine-
up and the 'third degree.' t' s 
The Court reiterated its dicta in Davis in the case of 
Hayes v. Florida, q wherethe defendant. had be.en t~ken 
from his home to the police station for, purposes of finger-
printing. The Court ruled that the involuntary removal of a 
person from .his home to the police station for purposes of 
fingerprinting, without pri.or judicial approval, required 
probable cause. 1° Citing the familiar "stop and frisk" cases, 
the Court observed that there is support in those cases for 
. the proposition that the fourth amendment would permit 
police to .temporarily detain a person for purposes of finger- · 
printing: (1) if there is reasonable suspicion that the person 
committed an offense; (2) If there is reasonable belief that 
fingerprinting the individual will establish or negate his 
connection with the crime; and (3) if the procedure is con-
ducted without delay. 11 The Court again noted that "the 
Fourth Amendment might permit thejudiciary to auth<;>rize 
the seizure of a person on less than probable cause and his 
removal to the police station for the purpose of fingerprint-
ing." 12 The Court, howeve~. did not clarify what the level 
of justification should be, or what procedures would be con-
sidered sufficiently protective for station-house 
fingerprinting. 
Given the repeated dicta that some basis less than pro):>a-
ble .cause might support station-house fingerprinting, it is 
not surprising that some states have promulgated specific 
procedures for obtaining judicial authorization for such in-
vestigative detentions. · 
State Response to the Davis-Hayes Dicta 
In responding to the Davis-Hayes dicta, states have 
adopted a variety of.procedures 'and standards. Colorado 
and Nebraska are illustrative. · 
Colorado. has adopted a comprehensive state· criminal 
procedural rule .which provides ,guidelines for obtaining 
"nontestimonial identification" such: as fingerprints, band-
writing, blood, urine, .and,hair sarnples.D The procedures 
are specifically not applicable to interrogation procedures. 14 
In summary, the Colorado procedures require a judicial or-
der supported by a written affidavit setting out articulable, 
objective facts which provide probable cause to believe that 
8/d. 
q 470 U.S. 81 I (1985). 
10 !d. at 817-18. 
11 Jd. at 816. 
12 /d. at 817. 
a crime has been committed and reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the suspect committed the offense. In addition, 
the judicial order, which is only valid for 10 days, must 
specify the conditions of the temporary detention and· inust 
.>be returned to the judge with the results' of the identifiCa-
tion procedures. " These procedures were held to be 
constitutional in People v. Madson, 16 in which the court 
specifically noted that they were instituted in response to 
the suggestive dicta in Davis. 17 
. In contrast' to th~ COlorado procedures are the st~tutory 
procedures in Nebraska which require that there be a show-
ing of probable cause before a suspect may be taken to the 
police station for'fingerprinting. 18 In State v. Evans, 1q the 
Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed with those states that 
permitted detentions on less than probable cause. In its 
view, the relevant United States Supreme Court cases re-
quire probable cause .to remove a person to the police 
station. 20 
It is important to note that in each of these two c~es; .. the 
investigation had focused. on a particular individual. It 
would appear that the major disagreement was over the 
question of whether. there should ~ a requisite showing of 
probable cause 'to believe that the· particular suspect com-
mitted the offense. It is also important to note that these 
cases and procedures predated the Supreme Court's dicta in 
Florida v. Hayes, which specifically restated .the proposition 
in Davis that some justification less than· probable cause 
might suffice. 
The Military Response: United States v. Fagan 
' ' .: ; -
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review .ad-
dressed the applicability of the Davis-.(I ayes dicta-in United 
States v. Fagan. 21 In that case, NIS investigators had I'ta· 
son to believe that the perpetrator of a series of bar:racks 
larcenies was one of approximately too servicemembers. 
They received the battalion cpmmander's permission to fi~­
gerprint the servicemembers at the NIS office 22. and a siaff 
officer was appointed to coordinate the process of taking 
them to the office in groups of 15 to 20. 23 The accused 
complied with the procedures mily after he was told .that 
his paychecJc, would be withheld until he appeared. 24 When 
the accused reported for fingerprinting, investigators noted 
that he had tried to scrape his fingertips but that some fea-
tures of his prints matched patterns in latent prints found at 
13 Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1 (1973). The rule is apparently modeled ~fter Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.i (1971) reported at 53 F.R.D. 462 (1971). 
14 Colo. R. Crim. P. 4l.l(h)(2). 
IS Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(e), (!). 
16 638 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1981) (en bane). 
17 ld. at 31. 
• 
1
.M Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3301, et. seq. 
19 215 Neb. 433, 338 N.W.2d 788 (1983). · 
20 215 Neb. at 438, 338 N.W.2d'at 793. The court.nonetheless round probable·cause. 
21 24 M.J. 865 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985). 
22 Id. at 866. 
l.lld. 
24/d. 
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·the :scene.'21 He was advised of his rights and interrogated. 
Later in the same day, his hands were photographed and 
his· fingerprints were taken. 2" 
' . . 
Because the first set of fingerprints was unreadable, NIS 
agents approached, the accused several months later at the 
installation hospital. 27 When he refused their request to 
· supply additional fingerprints, a Hospitalman First Class 
ordered him to comply. When the accused refused that or-
der, be was told by the NIS agents that they would 
eventualJy qbtain his prints even if it meant arresting him. 
Rather than risk the embarrassment of being apprehended, 
. pe went to the NIS offices several days tater and was finger-
printed, without incident. His ·prints matched those taken 
,from the crime scene. 28 . . 
. In concJuding that the fingerprints were admissible as the 
fruits of two separate and reasonable seizures of the ac-
cused, the court noted that the initial seizure of the accused 
occurred when he was ordered,by his battalion commander 
. ,to proceed to the .NIS office. 29 The court concluded that al-
though that seizure.was notsupported by. probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was involved in the 
. crimes, it was nonetheless reasonable considering the bal-
. ance of the government's inter,est and the minimum 
intrusiveness of the fingerprinting procedures. 30 The court 
. drew heavily upon the Davis-Hayes dicta in concluding that 
the commander in this case was acting in his magisterial ca-
pacity when he ordered the mass fingerprinting. The court 
stated: 
Although the commander in his quasi-judicial capacity 
. did not issue. a warrant for the production of finger-
/ print exemplars, as envisioned in Hayes and Davis, we 
conclude that within the military context, his presence 
safeguarded the appelliUlt from ·oppressive governmen-
tal' action and ftis order thereby qualifies as the 
functional equivalent of the ·"circumscribed proce-
dure" ·prescribed in Hayes and Davis which ·warrant 
the seizure of persons· for ·fingerprinting· on less than 
probable cause. As there is no civilian counterpart for 
· the iniHtary commander, our interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment recognizes that it must be con-
strued 'with' the "C?ntext of military society." As such, 
we believe the· presence of the commander. initially ne• 
gated the requirement for probable cause or Teasonable 
suspicion, where the appellant was treated properly at 
NIS and without fear 9r stigma .... 31 . 
As for the second fingerprinting session, the court relied on 
additional dicta in Hayes, which suggested that bdef field 
detentions could be used for fingerprinting if based upon 
reasonable suspicion. 32 Here, said the court, the NIS agents 
bad more than a reasonable suspicion that the accused was 
linked with the crime when they approached him at the 
. hospital. Because reasonable force could have been used to 
take his. fingerprints, the court considerea it proper to 
. "threaten" him with forcible loss of his freedom if he did 
not cooperate and permit his prints to be taken. ll 
. . 
A Response to Fagan: Measuring the "Circumscribed 
Procedures" 
While . analyzing· investigative. detention cases grounded 
on the· Davis-Hayes dicta, it is important to remember that 
the Supreme Court apparently envisions a narrow and 
stingy exception to the warrant and probable cause require-
ments. It. is also important to distinguish between 
investigative detentions which take place in the "field" and 
those which involve transporting the suspect to the offices 
of law enforcement personnel. With regard to "field" finger-
printing, the Court in Hayes envisioned a narrowly defined 
three-pronged requirement which incl~des: a reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect oommitted a crime; a reasonable 
basis for believing that the fingerprinting will establish or 
negate guilt; and a fingerprinting procedure that is "carri.ed 
out with dispatch." 34 • · · 
With regard· to poJic~ .station detentions· for purposes of 
fingerprinting, the Court 'in Davis recognized that deten-
tions for fingerprints might .. . . . under narrowly defined 
circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth Amend· 
ment even though there is no probable cause in the 
traditional sense." ls In Hayes, the Court stated that "under 
circumscribed procedures; the fourth amendment might per-
mit the judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on less 
than probable cause and his removal to the police station 
25 !d. Trial testimony from a forensic pathologist indicated that the scrapes were not accidental and had apparently been ~ade a short time before they were 
photographed by the NIS agents. 24 M.J. at 871. · 
26 I d. at 869. 
27 It is not clear from the court's opinion whether the accused was at the hospital due to an illness or whether he was otherwise assigned to the hospital 
pursuant to his duties. ' 
2&24 M.J. at 870. 
29 ld. at 866-67. The court concluded that the accused's freedom of movement was restrained against his will "solely for the purpose of law enforcement." ld. . .. . . . . . ' 
30 24 M.J. at 867. 
31 Id. at 868-69 (citations omitted). 
32 470 U.S. at 816. 
33 24 M.J. at 871. It does not seem likely that this is the sort of conclusion that the Supreme Court had in mind in the Hayes dicta. Although the poli~e may 
surely use reasonable force to effect an otherwise lawful seizure and investigation, it seems to stretch that case to the point where law enforcement officers 
may compel the suspect to appear at their office if he dOes not cooperate in the absence of probable cause. Here, the simple answer seems to be that when the 
NlS agents approached the suspect at the hospital they had probable cause to believe that be had committed the crime ancl therefore they could have 
brought him to their office without regard to whether they first asked his superior to order him to undergo additional fingerprinting. 
34 470 u.s. at 817. Although the three-pronged requirement seems specific enough, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in Hayes. there will certain-
ly be problems of application. For example, he noted that such field detentions would apparently be undertaken.in public view-which would be a ''singular 
intrusion" that could not be justified as necessary for the officer's safety. He also noted the difficulty of deciding how long to hold the suspect. ld. at 819. 
JS 394 V.S. at 727. 
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for· the purpose of fingerprinting. nJi> Although the Court 
did not suggest what "circumscribed procedures" would 
pass constitutional muster, it seems clear that the Court en-
visioned "judicial" authorization and supervision. when the 
basis for seizure was premised on something less ;than prob-
able cause. ·. 
. . Given the Court's narrow language, both Jor field and of-
fice detentions, the result in Fagan seems strained. The 
Court of Military Review stretched the Davis-Hay~s dicta 
with regard to the basis for ordering a servicemember to re-
port to investigative offices for the purposes of 
fingerprinting, and exaggerated the magisterial role of the 
commander in ordering such intrusions. 
With regard to the permissible basis for fingerprinting de-
tentions, the Supreme Court's dicta does not in any way 
suggest that, for purposes of fingerprinting, not even rea-
sonable suspicion is required. Instead, . as noted supra, the 
Court in Hayes v. Florida specifically envisioned that the 
police must have reasonable suspicion that.the suspect; com-
mitted a crime before taking fingerprints in the field. 37 It 
would be anomalous to require reasonable suspicion to sup-
port a "stop and frisk" detention for fingerprinting and yet 
conclude that neither probable cause nor reasonable suspi-
cion would be necessary to support the removal of a suspect 
to the police station. 
Witl~ regard to who may authorize office detentions for 
purposes of fingerprinting, the Supreme Court's dicta leaves 
no ~oubt that the Court would ·expect that the process 
wouJd be approved and supervised by the judiciary. The 
question for military CoUrtS then is whether the commander 
might properly fill that role. 38 It seems clear that· for pur-
poses of authorizing seizures for purposes of fingerprinting, 
a commander may act in a quasi-judicial capacity. It seems 
Jess certain that when the com111ander does so, such ap-
proval negates the requirement of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion. Indeed, the military law on this issue 
is well-settled and neither the dicta in Hayes and Davis nor 
military necessity calls for a new rule. 39 It also seems less 
. certain that the commander's approval negates the require-
ment to follow circumscribed procedures for ensuring that 
the suspect's rights are not unduly abrogated. 
~!though in Fagan the NIS obtained permission from the 
battalion commander to fingerprint the 100 ser-
vicemembers, it is not clear from the Court's opinion what, 
if any, articulable facts they presented to the commander. 
Nor is it clear to what extent the liaison officer appointed 
by the commander supervised the procedures. 40 What is 
clear, as the court recognized, is that there was neither 
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion supporting the 
commander's order that the accused report to the NIS of-
fice for fingerprinting. 41 
Looking for Help in the Rules of Evidence 
The Military Rules of Evidence provide no specific guid-
ance on investigative detentions, either in the field or at the 
police station, for purposes of fingerprinting. Rule 314(f) 42 
addresses searches incident to lawful stops but sets out no 
guidelines as to whether the "stop" may include other iden-
tification procedures such as fingerprinting. 
Rule 312 governs body views and intrusions and might 
provide the basis of fingerprinting. For example, Rule 
312(b) addresses "visual examination" of the body but 
hinges such examinations on other authorized intrusions 
such as a valid inspection, 43 a search incident to apprehen-
sion, 44 an emergency search, 45 or a probable cause 
search. 46 It would require a strained reading of Rule 312, 
however, to permit investigators to take an individual to 
their office for the specific purpose of fingerprinting, with-
out some independent predicate. · 
Rule 31 6(f) may pro~ide a vehicle for j~dicial adoption of 
the ''circumscribed procedures" envisioned in the Davis-
Hayes dicta for fingerprinting in either the field or at the 
·police ·station. That rule provides: 
Other seizures. A seizure of a type not otherwise in" 
· Cluded in this rule may be made when permissible 
36 470 U.S. at 817. In Da~is the Court stated: . . 
We have no occasion in this case, howev~r. to determine whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed 
procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation, 'the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause to arrest. 394 
U.S. at 728 (emphasis added). 
37 470 U.S. at 817. 
38 See Schlueter, Military Criminal Jus; ice: fractice and Procedure,§ 5-2(A) at 152 (2d ed. 1987); Cooke, United States v. Ezell: Is the Com~ander a ,Magis-
trate? Maybe, The Army Lawyer, Aug. 1979, at 9. 
•
19 Cf. Mil. R. Evid. 313(b). The commander can obviously make some fourth amendment-type intrusions for certain noninvestigative reasons without trig-
gering the requirements of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Although it is conceivable that an en masse fingerprinting procedure might be justified on 
grounds of security, fitness, or good order and discipline, if that procedure was conducted for purposes of obtaining evidence, it could not be treated as a 
valid inspection under Rule 313. · 
40 The court indicated that the NJS agents would call the liaison officer and ask that he provide them with "15 or 20 members of the battalion at a given 
time and a given place" for fingerprinting. The liaison officer apparently maintained the master list of who had been fingerprinted. 24 M.J. at 866. 
41 24 M.J. at 868. The court noted, however, that the NIS agents had reasonable grounds to believe that one of the approximately 100 Marines had commit· 
ted. the offense and that the fingerprinting process would identify the perpetrator. ld. 
42 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, Military Rule of Evidence 314 [hereinafter Mil. R. Evid.]. Rule 314 governs searches not requiring prob-
able cause; Rule 314(1) is a codification of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). In 1984, Rule 314(1)(3) was added to incorporate the "automobile frisk" 
recognized in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See generally; S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi, and D. Schlueter, Military Rules of E~idence Manual at 
255-56 (2d ed. 1986). As noted supra the Supreme Court has stated in dicta that Terry stops might properly include fingerprinting. Nor is there any real 
help in RCM 302, which governs military apprehensions. The discussion to that rule merely notes the distinction between apprehensions and investigative 
detention. 
41 Mil. R. Evid. 313(b). 
44 Mil. R. Evid. 314(g). 
45 Mil. R. Evid. 314(i) .. 
46 Mil. R. Evid. 315. 
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-under the.Consti-tution of the United States as applied 
to members. of the· Armed Forces. 
This rule, which p~allels .the catch-all .provision iri' Mili-
- ta,t:y. Rule of Evidence 314(k) for nonprobable cause 
, searches, permits some leeway; in the application of consti-
tutionally·. permissible seizures which ,are not otherwise 
specifically mentioned in the Rules. 47 .Seizures· for the spe-
cific purpose of fingerprinting would seem to be -safe 
. candidates for this catch-aU provision. 
Assuming that there is room within the Rules of Evi-
dence for judicial adoption ofsome narrowly defined 
procedures, there is the question of actuaJly settling upon 
these guidelines that may be readily and constitutionally 
applied in a. principled fashion. Given the absence of specif-
ic guidance ·in the Rules themselves, it would seem 
_preferable to consider amendments to either Rule -316, 314, 
. or 312 that would clearly set out defined .procedures tai-
lored to milita,ry practices. 48 · 
. . -, ' 
Circumscribed PrOcedures: A Model 
Using the Davis-Hayes dicta, Proposed Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41.1 (1971), 49 and a variety of state 
· procedur~s adopted in reliance on that dicta,, 50 it should 
not be difficult. to adopt ,some procedures, either judicially 
•·· or through formal. amendments to. the Rules of Evidence, 
Jor,extending the "Terry stop" to fingerprinting at the scene 
of the stop (in Rule 314) and for removing an individual to 
the investigators' office for the. specific pul"}>Qse of obtaining 
.. fingerprints (in Rule 316) . .In any event, several key topics 
must be considered: 
Characterizati~n of the Intrusion 
In ~ddressing th~ issue of investigative detentions for the 
purposes offingerprinting it is important to define what 
. goyernmental action triggers the fourth amendf!lent. It is 
well settled that ;an individual normally. has no reasonit~le 
.expectation of privacy in his or her fingerprints. 51 'fhus;the 
process of actuallytaking fingerprints does not normally in-
voke the protections of the fourth amendment. 52 If t~e 
suspect . or accused is already subject. to lawful authority 
pursuant to an arrest or apprehension, the additional. st~ps 
. of obtaining fingerprints or other identification evidence, 
· such as ·voice exemplars or other superficial body evi-
dence, n :are normally permitted without additional 
· authorizaiion or approval. 54 
If the suspect, or accu:;ed is not already within· t~e lawful 
custody. of the. police, it is necessary that some. authoriza-
tion or justification ~ articulated . to support the "seizure" 
of the person for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints. 55 
That justification may rest, as suggested in the Davis-Hayes 
·dicta; on extending the .. Terry stop'' to indude brief deten-
tions for fingerprinting, or' it_ may be justified by judicia1ly 
'supervised ·procedures ·that entail removing ·the individual 
to the' police station. 'In :either instance, the. individual has 
been "seized" and that necessarily invokes the protections 
of· the fourth ·amendment. 56 Of course, if the individual 
consents to the seizure, in much the same way an individual 
may consent to a search, then it should not be neeessaty to 
· 'show the underlying basis or approval for the seizure. 57 
Power to Authorize Investigative Detentions 
• ·; . . ! . ' ' •. ' .. 
:for fi1,1gerprinting in the fieJd, the Supreme Court's dicta 
. in ·Hayes already sets our clear guidelines which'authorize 
those making otherwise lawful "Terry siops"to firgerprint 
· those who have been detained. ~8 The same rule could be 
• easily .adapted to the military. 
• c : .. •,' 
. For detentions involving removal of the suspect to the of-
: flees of law enforcement officers, the solution again seems 
easily applied. Although the Davis-Hayes dicta envisions ju-
dicial approval, for the military that would include 
47 SeeS. Saltzburg, { Schinasi, and' D. Schlueter, s~pra note 42 at 302. Note that although the;~ is no Prafters' Analysis for this particular subp~rt of the 
Rule, the ''legislative" intent seems clear. · ,_. · ' · · · · ·· · 
48 /d. at 85 (there should be a preference for the "legislative" process which lends to interservice uniformity). 
~9 The text of the proposed Rule, entitled Nontestimonialldentifications, is printed at 52 F.R.D. 409 (1971). · 
·
50 See, ~.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13-3905; Col. R. Crim. P. 4Ll; Idaho Code§ 19~25; and N.C. Gen. Stats. § 15A-271, et seq. 
5
•
1 See. e.g., Cup~~. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); UnitedStates·~. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973); United States v. Hardison, 17 M.J. 191 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983). 
52 In any procedure implicating "body" evidence, there is always the possibility that the procedures used "shocked the conscience" or were otherwise unrea-
sonable and thus infringed upon the suspect's due process rights. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi, and D. 
Schlueter, supra note 42 at 224. Because of the limired physical intrusion of fingerprinting, -it should not be necessary to use medically trained personnel as is 
required in more intrusive body inspections or intrusions. See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 312(d), (e). ' · · 
5l United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); United States v. Repp, 23 M.J.-S89 (A:F.C.M.R. 1986) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in arms); United 
''States v. Hardison, 17 M.J. 701 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983) (no expectation of privacy In appearance which would bar photographing suspect). See also In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 686 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1982) (grand jury request for hair samples did not amount to search·or seizure). 
54 Different rules may apply for more intrusive procedures which are used to obtain body fluids or other evidence within the body. MiL R Evid. 312(d), (e). 
'·· Cf MiL R. Evid. 313(b) (inspection may iriclude order to provide body fluids). 
55 See, e.g:, United States v: Hardison, I '1 M.f '101 (N.M.C.M.R: 1983) (fingerprints taken of suspect already within lawful custody of NIS agents);'See also 
United States•v, Sechrist, 640 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sanders, 477 F.2d 112 {5th Cir. 1973). , . r. 
56 Although the "basis" for such limited seizures may not require probable cause, the Dunaway-Schneider test for· determining when a servicemember has 
been seized within the meaning of the fo11rth .amendment should remain .usefuL There is a problem with application of.that principle to ,mass sei~ures, such 
as in Fagan where 100 individuals were ordered to report. Technically, all of them were targets .l>f the investigation allhpugh the reCord does not il;ldicate 
wbether·any of them, besides the accused, protested. The better _starting point is to conclude that all of them were seized within the meaning of the fourth 
. amendment; as applied in the military context, and then determine whether a sufficient fourth amendment basis, also applied in the military context, sup-
ported these seizures. · , . · . . . · . . . .· . . . , , 
The Supreme Court has distinguished subpoenas and investigative detentions, see, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973), in large part'becailse 
of the lack of stigma in the former procedure and because they are within the control and supervision of the court. Investigative detentions at the office of the 
law enforcement agent should not fall within that category unless they have been judicially approved and supervised. · 
H See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 3 14{e). Indeed, it would seem appropriate to require investigators requesting authorization to first show that the individual has not 
consented, or is expected not to consent. 
~M470 U.S. at 816-17. 
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commanders who already are authorized to approve proba-
ble cause searches ' 9 and to order inspections. (>() 
Basis for Authorization 
For field detentions, the Supreme Court's dicta in Davis 
and Hayes seems to articulate clearly what the Court envi-
sions as the minimal constitutional basis for taking 
fingerprints. As noted, supra, the investigators must be pre-
pared to show that they had a reasonable basis for believing 
that the fingerprinting procedures would either connect the 
suspect with the crime or clear him. 61 Thus, it would seem 
that the Court envisioned something beyond a routine and 
carte blanche authorization to fingerprint those stopped in 
the field. · 
Perhaps the most critical issue in adopting rules and pro-
cedures for fingerprinting at the offices of the investigators 
is the question of whether probable cause must be shown, 
as is now required under Dunaway for custodial interroga-
tions, or whether to follow the Davis-Hayes dicta and adopt 
some lesser standard. If a lesser standard is appropriate, 
what should it be? Clearly, the safest and most protective 
constitutional route is to require probable cause for the un-
derlying seizure of the suspect or accused. But that may 
unduly bind investigators who have some articulable justifi-
cation amounting to less than probable cause which would 
reasonably expedite criminal investigation. 
Good arguments for adopting a standard less than proba-
ble cause are recognized and catalogued in the Davis and 
Hayes cases and need only be summarized here: the finger-
printing procedures are generally more reliable; they do not 
entail subjecting the suspect to the abuses such as the 
.. third degree" or an improper line-up; they need not be 
conducted unexpectedly; and they are usually less intrusive 
than other police detentions and searches. 62 These differ-
ences are not compelling enough, however, to justify 
seizures without any basis whatsoever. 
The better route is to adopt a reasonable suspicion stan-
dard. That would be consistent with the minimum for field 
detentions. At the same time, this standard recognizes that, 
although there are always the inherent embarrassments, 
dangers, and fears most often associated with police station 
'
9 Mil. R. Evid. 315(d). 
(>()Mil. R. Evid. 313(b). 
61 470 u.s. 817. 
62 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 727 (1969). 
· appearances. intervening judicial authorization can inter-
pose reasonable limits upon the detention in terms of its 
length and scope. 
There is a related problem of the scope of the suspicion. 
Must it focus on one individual or may it focus on a larger 
and more generalized population? In the state cases cited 
supra, investigators had focused on a particular suspect. In 
contrast, the NIS investigators in Fagan focused on 100 ser-
vicemembers-hardly individualized suspicion. Despite the 
court's characterization to the contrary, that sort of mas-
sive fingerprinting appears to be a ''dragnet." Absent truly 
extraordinary reasons, it is probably safe to say that similar 
procedures would normally not be tolerated in· the civilian 
community. 63 
There is some support in New Jersey v. TLO, 64 a school 
search case, for the proposition that in certain instances a 
generalized suspicion may suffice. 65 In the context of the 
fingerprinting, those seeking judicial approval for the finger-
printing should be prepared to show that there is reasonable 
suspicion to believe that an .individual or identified group of 
individuals are implicated and that all other necessary and 
reasonable means of investigation have failed to identify'the 
perpetrator. The greater the number of possible suspects, 
the greater should be the burden of showing necessity for 
the procedures, and the exhaustion. of other reliable police 
investigative techniques. The type and severity of the of-
fense should also be factored into the formula. 66 
Investigative fingerprint detentions should never become 
.routine to the extent that every time latent fingerprints are 
discovered at the scene of a crime that any and all individu-
als in any way remotely linked with the offense can be 
taken in for fingerprinting . 
Although written affidavits are.not required for p~obable 
cause searches, 67 good arguments can be rriade for requir-
ing law enforcement officers to place their justifications for 
fingerprinting requests in writing, especially if the proposed 
procedures involve mass detentions. Similarly it. would 
seem preferable to require the individual requesting the fin-
gerprinting detention to be placed under oath. 68 Unlike 
probable cause searches which may involve an element of 
urgency for prompt approval and execution, fingerprinting 
6J C/ In re Fingerprinting of M.D., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3 (1973) (22 students fingerprinted pursuant to court order when school ring was found 
near homicide victim and victim's car contained fingerprints other than victim's; order included protective provision for destruction of prints at conclusion of 
investigation). The tolerance level no doubt rises with the severity of the crime. Whether several barracks larcenies involving stereo equipment justifies finger-
printing 100 servicemembers is open to debate. Assuming that such offenses, in the context of the time and place, are clearly and objectively viewed as 
serious offenses, someone other than the police should make that determination. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (danger in permitting 
police to strike the balance between social and individual interests). 
64 469 u.s. 343 (1985). 
M ld. at 342, n.8. The Court stated in part: 
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In 
other contexts, however, we have held that althoUgh "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite .to a constitutional search or , 
seizure . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion . : . Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspi· 
cion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available to 
"assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field.' " (Citations omitted.) 
66 See United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d Ill (9th Cir. 1972) (court declined to apply Davis dictum when suspect was detained in order to match his prints 
with those found on marijuana wrappers). See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3905 (police must show "reasonable belier• that felony has been committed). 
~7 Mil. R. Evid. 31 5(0, Drafters' Analysis. 
bHUnited States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347 (C.M.A. 1981). 
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generally does not and it would .not seem unreasonable to 
·impose these 8dditiona1 safeguards. ~. · 
SC!'pe of Authorization 
the· ''judicial"· authorization· to conduct a police station 
investigative detention should specify the exact seope and 
·purpose;ofthe detention."" For 'example, the authorization 
eould sbtte that only fingerprints will be taken and that no 
interfogation is authorized unless there is a showing of 
probable cause. 70 If mv~tigators desire to gather additional 
identification evidence such as voice prints or hair samples, 
the authoniation should cover those points. If the investi-
. gator8 desire to obtain body evidence such as blood, urine, 
or saliva samples, they should be otherwise prepared to 
eomply with Military Rule of Evidence 312. Finally, con-
sidering the possibiHty of police overreaching, and ·for 
pragmatic 'reasons associated· with· proof at trial, it would 
seem prefer~ble to reduce the authorization to writing. 
' ' ' . 
Exectitlon 
Like the provisions for executing search authorizations, 71 
.any authorization to fingerprint individuals or to obtain 
other body evidence should include a· provision for notify. 
ingthe individual ofthe purpose of thedetention. 72 As has 
been adopted in'at least one state, the execution of the au· 
thcirization may be.limited to a particular time, such as 
. regular duty hours, and may be effective for a definite peri-
od of time.•73 Th~ purJ>ose·of all of this is to reftect and 
. maintain th~ unique. features of fingerprinting which dis-
tinguish that procedure from interrogation and line-up 
procedures. 74 
Exigencies 
Finally, provision should be made .for the fact that in 
some limited _situa~ions, exigent circumstances might P,re-
vent obtaining prior authorization .. Nonetheless, just as 
exigent circumstances will normaJiy not warrant. abrogation 
of the requirement for probable cause, 7$ exigencies should 
not abrogate the requirement for reasonable suspicion. Be-
cause fingerprints are .not evanescent, 76 there should be 
very few cases where investigators .cannot obtain. prior. and 
careful review of their request to take the fingerprints. 77 
• Conclusioll 
Tlte Fagan case is an unmistakable i~dication t~f 'a gap 
exists in both the Military Rules of Evidence and military 
case. law: Given the unique issues raised by that case and 
. the problems it demonstrates, some careful .consideration 
should be givento developing clear, and definit.e principles 
which can be readily applied by a worldwide legal system. 
The most logical choice is a series of amendments. to ,the 
Rules of. Evidence that. would address not only. fingerprint· 
ing, but· related evidence-gathering techniques .which in 
themselves generally .will not require a further invasion of 
privacy but which, at the outset, require seizure of the indi· 
viduaL Such changes would help ensure that the 
administration of criminal justice in the military is not hap-
hazard or unprincipled. · 
69 See, e.g. Pr~~ Fed. R. crim. P. 41.1; Colo. R. Crim. P. 4Ll~ ~· 
7° For example, in Fagan the NIS investlgat~rs, according to the court, had probable cause when th~y .examined the suspect's fif!g~rtips and determi~ed that 
-he bad attempted to remove his prints. 24 M.J. at 869-70. .. . .· ' · . . · 
71 Mil. R. Evid. 315(h). . 
12 Mil. R.: Evid~ jJS(h)(l ) .. 
1l See, e;g,, cOlo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(1)(10 days); Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.1 Oudicial order retur~able within 45 days). 
74 Davis ~- MisSissippi, 394 u.s. at 727. · · . · · . · 
. 
75 See! Mil .• R: · Evid. 'j I S(g) (the exigent ciri:umstances only relieve the requirement o.f the search warrant or authori~tion) . 
. ?6 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 727 (there is no danger of destruction of lingerprints). . 
77 Despit': ~he ~ouo's ~urance in. Davis supra note 76, that fingerprints: cannot be destroyed, the Fagan case demonstrates that sus~ts might attempt to 
remove their fingerprints and thus frustrate prompt identification. 
Dunaway v. New York: Is There a Military Application? 
Captain Elizabeth W. Wallace• 
Contract Appeals Division, USALSA 
Introduction 
In the late 1970's, the Supreme Court ruled in two cases 
that the illegal seizure of an individual based on less than ! 
probable cause eould r~ult in suppression of evidence ob· 
tained as a ·result of the ·seizure. The· nat~re of traditional 
investigative techniques employed by military law enforce-
ment !lgencies significantly elevates the importance of these 
decisions. The purpose of this article is ~o analyze th~ Su-
preme Court and military cases that have addressed this 
issue and to propose a rationale by which a military eourt 
might fairly reconcile these caSes with accepted military' in-
vestigatory practices. 
·. In the first case, Brown v. Illinois, '·police officers "arrest· 
ed" the accused without a warrant. Following a lengthy 
•This article was originally submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 36th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course. 
1422 U.S. S90 (197S). 
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